Executive Summary
The Problem.
Although existing estimates of adaptation funding needs in developing countries are still very vague, they all indicate that they are and will be in the tens of billions €/$ per annum. At the same time, many developing countries presently do not have the relevant 'absorptive capacity' -the capacity to carry out the adaptation measures needed −even if the funding were available. Most will unnecessarily have to suffer adverse impacts of climate change that could be avoided under an improved adaptation regime. The responsibility for these avoidable adverse impacts -whether due to a lack of funding or of absorptive capacity − will fall squarely on industrialised countries. Some stakeholders, mainly from the developed world, have been tempted to cite the lack of certainty about the adaptation funding needs of developing countries and their lack in absorptive capacity as reasons to postpone a debate of the thorny issue of international adaptation finance. This is short-sighted at best and disingenuous at worst. The two issues are intricately linked, and there is an urgent need to look into ways of simultaneously scaling up the provision of adaptation funds for developing countries of the appropriate kind, and the absorptive capacity to use these funds meaningfully. While this paper is about the former, the debate on how the funds are best spent on the ground is by no means of lesser importance.
At present, all international adaptation funding instruments − except the recently operationalised Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund − are replenished through ODA-type bilateral donations. The level of international funding for adaptation in developing countries is woefully inadequate to meet projected needs. The current bilateral donation instruments are unlikely to ever be able to generate the required levels of funding, especially as it is meant to be additional to ODA (viz. experience with the Monterrey 0.7% GNI commitment for ODA).
Moreover, adaptation funding is seen by most developing countries not as a matter of 'donations' but as one of costs imposed by developed countries, and as such as debt incurred by them. Accordingly, neither of the traditional ODA funding modes (grants or concessionary loans), are seen to be appropriate payment modes. Funding is expected, and must be 'acceptable', in the sense of being not only appropriate, but new and additional, predictable, equitable, and adequate.
International Adaptation Finance
Innovative Sourcing. Further innovative financing mechanisms apart from the CDM Adaptation Levy are needed to fill the adaptation 'funding chasm. ' The only way to provide funding for developing country adaptation which is acceptable, in the above-mentioned sense, is through international levies on emissions from international maritime transport and aviation/air travel and/or through international auctioning of assigned amount units (i.e. an adaptation levy on the proceeds of international emissions trading).
Strategic Allocation. Internationally, funds for adaptation need to be allocated on a strategic basis and not involve international micro-management at the project level. The strategic allocation of international adaptation funds should not attempt to re-invent the wheel. It should use the existing international bodies and initiatives to allocate funding streams, and not try to duplicate them under a 'climate change banner.' Domestically, as mentioned above, there is a need to enhance 'absorptive capacity' not only at the project level, but more importantly -following the Paris Declaration − at the level of domestic policy ('adaptation mainstreaming').
Governance. The governance of the recently operationalised Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund represents a milestone in the evolution of international funding mechanisms, since for the first time developing countries have genuine ownership of such an instrument. In the case of adaptation funding, developing country ownership and public transparency of decision making is not only desirable but a prerequisite for success, particularly in the context of mainstreaming activities. Given this, the Adaptation Fund should be the main instrument for the purpose of raising and managing of international adaptation finance for developing countries.
A. Introduction
Any view on international finance for developing country adaptation − strategic or not -must deal with the question of how much adaptation to climate change impacts in developing countries does/will cost, and how much is/will be available under current conditions. While closing the expected funding gap -or, as some have called it 'adaptation funding chasm'-is not the only strategic adaptation finance issue, it is a core issue -if there are no funds, using them appropriately becomes rather like counting angels on pinheads. This does not mean that providing adequate funds alone will be sufficient to achieve adequate adaptation: there are equally difficult problems to be overcome at the potential recipient end, often characterised in terms of '(insufficient) absorptive capacity'. However, the present study focuses exclusively on the fundraising end of this spectrum of required activities.
As such it begins in Section A by looking into current estimates of funding needs for adaptation in developing countries, and current international adaptation funding, to illustrate the proportions of the 'adaptation funding chasm.' Section B discusses 11 proposals for adaptation funding which have been put forward by UNFCCC Parties and others, and ends with an evaluation of these proposals with regard to the criteria of being new and additional, predictable, appropriate, equitable, adequate. Section C is devoted to the question of how the money is to be disbursed at the international level, and the report concludes with a discussion of how such innovative international finance should be managed.
Current estimates of funding needs for adaptation in developing countries

• Although existing estimates of adaptation funding needs are still very vague, they all indicate a level of funding needed for developing countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change in the tens of billions €/$ per annum. • Many developing countries presently do not have the relevant 'absorptive capacity', i.e. the capacity to carry out the adaptation measures needed, even if the funding were available.
• Most will have to suffer adverse impacts of climate change that could be avoided under an improved adaptation regime.
• The responsibility for these adverse impacts -whether due to a lack of funding or of absorptive capacity − will be squarely put on industrialised countries.
How much does and will climate change adaptation cost in developing countries? While the question seems to be straightforward enough, answers -not surprisingly, given the complexity and variety of adaptation -are very difficult. The World Bank guesstimates current needs of 9−41 billion US dollars ($). 1 Although the base data for these figures have been disputed, 2 Table 1 − taken from the original source -is nonetheless interesting because it illustrates just how thin on the ground these estimates had to be because of high uncertainties associated with the methodology (guesstimates of global percentages).
They were followed by figures put forward by OIES ($2−17 billion 3 ), Oxfam (greater than $50 billion 4 ), UNDP ($86 billion 5 ) and UNFCCC ($28−67 billion 6 ). All these figures are very rough estimates, based on certain 'top-down' methodologies such as the World Bank estimates of the cost of 'climate proofing' current investment flows (see Table 1 ). They are also not generally comparable, since they are about different types of adaptation needs, such as:
• climate proofing Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other 'business as usual' investment flows; • climate proofing of existing infrastructure;
• additional investments necessary because of climate change (e.g. dams, dykes etc.); • costs on community level (community based adaptation, capacity building by NGOs etc.); and • 'mainstreaming' adaptation into poverty reduction strategies and other relevant government policies.
As mentioned before, adaptation in developing countries is not just an issue of funding, but also of sufficient 'absorptive capacity.' Even if the funding were available, most developing countries would, at present, not have the capacity to spend it, to carry out all the adaptation needed.
The result would be an avoidable increase in what has euphemistically become known as 'residual impacts,' that is impacts that that happen despite the existing impact reduction measures (i.e. by mitigation and adaptation combined). As reported in the recent Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, the cost of these impacts could in future amount to two-orders of magnitude (hundreds of times) more than these adaptation funding needs estimates. As summarised in Table 2 , the total of multilateral fiscal payments (i.e. non-reimbursable payments from general domestic fiscal revenue 8 ) for international adaptation funding -be it through the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), and the GEF Special Priority to Adaptation − until 2012 is presently estimated at around $200m. Assuming that (most of) the money received has already been spent, this leaves an average of around $13m per annum over the next five years.
Clearly these figures are orders of magnitude too small to cover even the most conservative estimates of the adaptation funding needs of developing countries (see above). This − and the fact that the situation is similar with respect to the expected developing country mitigation costs that would have to be met to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to current levels by 2030 − has led to a number of proposals for a commitment by the richer countries of the world to increase their bilateral financial flows accordingly. Thus China has suggested (see Section B.2.2) that developed countries should commit to an additional 0.5% of GDP for climate change payments to developing countries -additional to the 0.7% Monterrey consensus 9 ODA target (i.e. $260 billion 2007) 10 − which currently would amount to an additional annual contribution of around $185 billion, albeit not all for adaptation.
While it would be a giant step forward in North-South relations if any such legally binding bilateral funding targets could be agreed, and while it is arguably 11 the only situation in which developing countries might consider to take on legally binding mitigation targets, current bilateral ODA flows show that it would be very difficult to deliver.
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been rather upbeat about the performance of its member countries with regard to the 0.7% of GNI Monterrey ODA target. 12 The fact is, however, that only small economies have reached or surpassed the 0.7% target (see Fig. 1 ). Any substantive increase in ODA would have to come from the G7 countries, since they amount for the lion's share of all ODA (73%, see Fig. 2 ). The problem is that at 0.23%, their performance was actually below the overall DAC average of 0.28%, which itself is not very encouraging, particularly in light of its falling trend over the last couple of years.
The 'Domestic Revenue Problem.' However it stands to reason, in light of the historic evidence, and on more general grounds that this or any other sudden significant increase in fiscal (bilateral/multilateral) funding is unlikely to materialise in any of the large DAC members due to a general psychological and political 'domestic revenue problem': money that is raised domestically, particularly through domestic taxation, is regarded to be nationally owned. Indeed, in the case of taxation, individual tax payers often see themselves as direct owners of the revenue raised. And the sums involved in ODA or any other tax expenditure are generally perceived in absolute terms, which can create problems, particularly if they are in competition with other (domestic) expenditures. While it may be acceptable to send one or two hospitals' worth of tax-payers money abroad, this may no longer be the case for the equivalent of 100 hospitals. 13 This problem is psychological because it is very much a matter of how the sums in question are perceived. It is political because the source of the revenue − particularly in the case of taxation − is also the source of political power (voters, businesses), which means that politicians may be at times less than forthcoming in showing the leadership required to overcome the problem. Given then the less than satisfactory, not to say disappointing performance of the larger world economies (G7) with regard to achieving the Monterrey target, the question has to be: how could one raise the additional funding required to meet the developing world's adaptation needs?
B. How to raise the funding needed? The need for innovation The developing country demand for 'new and additional' funds from developed countries, as well as for their 'adequacy' and 'predictability' is by no means new. It has been articulated again and again, not least in Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC. 15 And, as has again been highlighted in the largely critical reactions 16 to the recent World Bank proposal for a Pilot Adaptation Fund (now "Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience"), the funding of developing country adaptation in the form of loans -no matter how concessional -is generally rejected as not appropriate not only by developing countries: 17 Given the patterns of differentiated (historic) responsibilities, the costs for developing country adaptation are seen as debts to be borne by the still largely responsible industrialised world, and debts cannot be repaid by loans, or even by 'grants' -if that notion is interpreted in terms of the provider of the funds doing the recipient a favour. Moreover, given this pattern of differentiated responsibilities, there are also very strongly held views on the importance of an equitable distribution of the burden of such funding.
Due to the stepped-up pace of the current UN climate change negotiations, there are host of new initiatives with regard to international adaptation finance, albeit not all of them completely satisfactory with respect these demands. The remainder of this Section will briefly introduce these proposals (Sections B.1-9) and then turn to evaluate them (Section B.10) with respect to these demands.
Conventional Funding
Foreign public sector investments/payments -whether bilateral or multilateral -have traditionally been in the form subscribed to by ODA, namely grants or (concessional) loans financed through the general budget of the donor country -i.e. based on revenue from conventional instruments such as income tax, cooperation tax, customs and excise duties, etc.
For the present purposes, this is referred to as 'conventional funding,' as opposed to funding which is raised through new, in particular, carbon-based instruments such as the auctioning of emission permits in the context of an emission trading scheme, which, as such, is genuinely additional to the conventional revenue and accordingly referred to as being 'unconventional'.
Another key characteristic of these traditional payments -apart from their fiscal origin -is their fundamentally discretionary nature. Even though their overall level may be fixed and enshrined in the domestic law of the donor country, it is inevitably up to the 'donor' to decide who should get it. In short, developing countries are not taken to have a 'right' or 'entitlement' to such donations. This is something which does not fit easily with how funding for adaptation is perceived.
World Bank Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR)
As mentioned, the launch of the World Bank 'Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience' (PPCR) 18 has been -and, at the time of writing, continues to be -fraught with controversy. While initially the focus of contention was (i) on the appropriateness of establishing an 'Adaptation Pilot Fund' -as it was initially known -widely interpreted as a move to compete with the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund which had only just been operationalised a couple of months before, and (ii) on its retrograde governance structure, 19 is now mainly about the fact that most of the funding to be made available under the PPCR is to be in the form of loans, moreover, loans that are to be counted as ODA.
The main reason why many developing countries and NGOs object to adaptation funding for developing countries in the form of ODA loans is that, given the prevailing pattern of historic responsibilities for climate change, developing countries see themselves forced into carrying out adaptation measures largely imposed on them by the industrialised world. Accordingly, they expect to be compensated for the associated costs, and reject the idea that compensation can be in the form of grants or loans, and as part of ODA.
At the time of writing, the PPCR was earmarked to receive £250 million from the UK mostly in the form of concessional loans. Although the exact figure of how much of this funding will be in the form of grants is still uncertain, the latest figure available was that up to £13 million would be available as grants under the Strategic Climate Fund, the 'mother fund' of the PPCR. 20 This means £50 million per annum of concessional loans, and just over £2 million per annum in grants. 21 As mentioned earlier, this would currently amount to $185 billion per annum. Unfortunately, nothing more is specified with regards to how much of that money would be spent on adaptation in developing countries, but since it is unlikely that adaptation is going to have a larger share than mitigation or technology transfer, $46 billion (25%) would seem to be reasonable upper limit for adaptation.
The Mexican Multilateral Climate Change Fund (MCCF) Proposal
In Bali, Mexico put forward a proposal for a Multilateral Climate Change Fund of predictable size, with contributions from developed and some developing countries … toward expanding global mitigation efforts. 22 However, it also envisages an adaptation levy on its disbursements (destined for the Adaptation Fund), which is why it is of relevance to the present discussion. Moreover it does have an intriguing revenue mechanism worth mentioning here and discussing in Section B.10.
The size of the expected revenue is not explicitly specified. Initially, the MCCF is to be filled with some tens of billions of dollars annually, while ultimately, it is meant to be able to meet a significant part of the additional flows of finance required by developing countries to meet the costs of reducing their emissions, estimated 23 to be in the region of $95billion in 2030. Assuming an adaptation levy of 2 percent, this would mean annual adaptation revenue of between $0.2 billion and $1.9 billion (in 2030). In other words, industrialised countries are meant to be bound by contribution commitmentsthe relative share of which to be determined by a Responsibility-and-Capability (R&C) indicator. While the default for the source of these (mandatory) contributions appears to be the general country budget, the proposal leaves open the possibility of also using revenues from carbon auctioning for these purposes. As concerns the nature of the envisaged funding, the Mexican proposal is thus what might be called a 'conventional/unconventional hybrid.'
As concerns the envisaged developing country contributions, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are, from the outset, expected to have a certain quota of the revenue at their disposal without being themselves expected to contribute.
Other ('emerging') developing country economies -presumably defined in terms of the R&C index − will, however, be expected to provide some contributions, against the insurance that they Up to 60% of the funding can go to international funds, provided they are created pursuant to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or an agreement negotiated under the Convention and fulfil certain additional requirements, most of which clearly satisfied by the Adaptation Fund. 25 
EU ETS Auction Adaptation Levies
The domestic scheme
The auctioning of emission permits to the private sector entities covered by the EU ETS is rapidly gaining ground and is likely to play a significant role in the post-2012 phase of the scheme, with revenues expected to be in the region of €75 billion per annum in 2020. 26 Moreover, it is envisaged that at least 20% should be used for a number of climate change related activities, among them to facilitate developing countries' adaptation to the impacts of climate change 27 with the proviso that particular priority should be given to addressing the needs of Least Developed Countries. 28 However, the adaptation needs of developing countries are by far not the only activity that is to be funded through this hypothecated share of the auction revenues. They are competing with other areas, most of them -in keeping with the above-mentioned domestic revenue problem − concerned with 'domestic' issues such as contributions to the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, to the development of renewable energy (to meet certain EU targets), to carbon capture and storage, to address social aspects in lower and middle income households, and to adaptation to climate impacts in the EU. Moreover, the funding that is meant for the developing world is not just for adaptation, but also for avoided deforestation. Accordingly, the assumption that one-tenth of this hypothecated money − the equivalent of a 2 percent levy on the total auction revenue (or €1.5 billion/$2.4 billion in 2020) -will be spent on covering the adaptation funding needs of developing countries may be somewhat optimistic.
The aviation scheme
The EU has decided to include aviation in the EU ETS. And while this would have been a perfect opportunity to overcome at least some of the domestic revenue problem, at least with respect to the level of the member states, that opportunity was unfortunately not realised, since it is member states who will carry out the auctioning of airline emission allowances, and it is member states who will be determining the use to be made of the revenue generated in these auctions, 29 30 According to the recent UNFCCC Background Paper on investment and financial flows to address climate change, auctioning of international aviation and shipping allowances could raise significant revenues ($22 billion in 2010 at $23.6/tCO 2 ), 31 which means the EU scheme should yield a not insignificant amount of revenue, but again, as far as covering the cost of adaptation in developing countries, it is still not really predictable, because the EU member states can decide to have other priorities among the options mentioned, priorities which lie closer to home.
The Swiss Proposal Global Carbon Adaptation Tax Proposal
During the high-level segment of COP12 in Nairobi (December 2006), the Swiss Environment Minister proposed a global carbon tax to cope with the adaptation financing gap that became more and more apparent at the time. Since then, the idea has been fleshed out through a number of projects commissioned by the Federal Office for the Environment, the latest of which ) was presented at SB28 in Bonn.
The revenue for the Swiss Proposal (the Proposal) is to be raised through a uniform global carbon tax of $2/tCO 2 on all fossil fuel emissions, with a basic tax exemption of 1.5tCO 2 per inhabitant. The introduction of a per capita based basic tax allowance, of course, means that de facto there is a differentiate tax rate between countries/regions. For example, most of the Sub-Saharan African countries will have their emissions covered by their exemptions and thus have a zero tax rate. Indeed all countries will have their implied tax rate reduced below the $2/tCO 2 nominal value. Under the chosen parameter values (tax level and exemption level), the scheme is meant to raise a global total of $48.5 billion per annum (in 2010), 48% from developed and 52% from developing countries (see Figure 3 ). The collection of this tax is to be carried out by the appropriate domestic agencies.
The disbursement of the revenue is to be partly domestic through 'National Climate Change Funds,' and partly multilateral into a 'Multilateral Adaptation Fund' (MAF). According to the Proposal, the function of MAF would initially be taken on by the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund (AF) until such a time as a significant number of countries have joined the scheme 32 at which point the function is meant to be taken over by a new international institution, complementary to the AF, because the remit of the AF is (mistakenly) taken to be solely to operate in a project mode. 33 Interestingly, particularly in the context of the Section on "How to spend the money raised" below, the funding is to be spent on two different themes ('Pillars'), namely 34 
(i) Prevention Pillar: Climate change impact (risk) reduction. (ii)
Insurance Pillar: Climate impact response: relief, rehabilitation, recovery.
This clearly corresponds to the idea of adopting a more 'hands-off' strategic approach that will be advocated below, but it also needs to be emphasised that the authors' narrow view on the remit of the AF − and thus on the necessity to introduce a new institutional set-up for their MAF -in unwarranted. After all, the main aim of the proposed World Bank Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) 35 is precisely to prepare the AF to be able to undertake the sort of 'mainstreaming' activities which the Proposal sees as the mainstay of Prevention Pillar.
One potential problem with the Swiss Proposal − as illustrated in Schwank and Mauch (2008) − concerns the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. While nominally, the Proposal uses an undifferentiated tax rate ($2/tCO 2 ), compliance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is meant to be ensured through the basic tax exemption of 1.5tCO 2 per capita, together with the differentiated payments into the Multilateral Fund is meant to ensure the scheme adheres to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The problem is that the fairness of the disbursement, in this context, cannot be assessed in the absence of adaptation cost figures. 36 The sharing of the taxburden, in turn, is most likely going to be judged against historic responsibilities, according Source: to which Annex I should shoulder two-thirds (65%), 37 and not (less than) half the burden, as would be the case in the scenario discussed in Schwank and Mauch (2008) .
Even if mitigating circumstances − such as historic ignorance of the effects of emissions − are admitted in the calculation of responsibility, it is unlikely that the absence of an explicit acknowledgment of the different economic circumstances resulting in more differentiated implied tax rates would be acceptable. The 'basic needs' allowance of 1.5tCO 2 per capita of the Proposal reflects economic levels only indirectly, insofar as low per capita GDP, in general, goes together with low per capita emissions. But not always, as the case of Brazil and South Africa, finding themselves at the upper end of the tax scale in the company of Japan and the US, clearly demonstrates (Figure 4) . Having said this, it should be straightforward to address these problems by introducing additional subsistence allowances per poor inhabitant, as used in , to calculate limited responsibility proportions.
A more serious problem for the Proposal may be what we referred to as that of 'domestic revenue,' i.e. that it may be politically impossible to convince, say, the American tax payer to send an additional $6.9 billion −the figure quoted in Schwank and Mauch (2008) as the expected 2010 US contribution to the proposed MAF− of "their" tax money abroad, keeping in mind the current (2007) US ODA figure of $22 billion. 38 
The EU Global Climate Financing Mechanism (GCFM)
During the 2008 Spring Meeting of the World Bank/IMF Development Committee, the European Commission announced that they − and the World Bank − were exploring the possibility of using the capital markets by launching a bond that would constitute a Global Climate Financing Mechanism. The funds generated will be used as grants to finance ongoing initiatives aimed at helping the poorest developing countries deal with climate change. The IFF concept is based by two key ideas, namely (i) to 'frontload' funding (spending money now for critical investments), and (ii) using future annual commitments for repayment. IFFs are targeted at problems that are urgent and larger in scale than the domestic revenue problem would allow to finance. An IFF is a legal entity that issues bonds to the international capital markets against legally binding pledges/assurances for future repayment from (donor) countries. As such IFFs provide a platform for substantial funding commitments that remain off-budget until actually paid to the IFF. 41 They are innovative insofar as they can overcome the domestic revenue problem, although traditionally, they are being used to frontload ODA, which in the climate change context would not constitute the new and additional resources envisaged in the Bali Road Map. However, the Commission also envisages payback guarantees other than pledges of future ODA, such as revenues generated through the carbon market 42 − for instance, auction revenues -which would clearly make IFF funding 'new and additional,' and overcome the domestic revenue problem of EU ETS auctioning scheme discussed earlier.
As the predicted future flows of the AF may rise significantly after 2012, the GCFM could be set up as a bridging finance facility for a period of 5 years until the AF can function at a sufficient scale. Taking into account a minimum period for setting up an IFF, there are thus good arguments for a frontloading period of 2010-2014. For a disbursement of, say, €1 billion per year for five years (2010-2014), and an interest rate of 4%, the annual repayments over 20 years would amount to €380 million. 43 These annual repayments could come from future ODA, from carbon linked revenue or from another innovative source like the airline ticket levy.
The funding from the proposed GCFM would be primarily targeted at the countries of the EC's Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), i.e. poor developing countries that are most affected and that have the least capacity to deal with climate change. As such, the GCFM would focus on providing grants for adaptation action in Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, although it might also be used to finance mitigation action where this contributes to the relevant domestic poverty reduction strategies. 44 
An Adaptation Levy on International Emissions Trading
The Template: CDM Adaptation Levy
The one key advantage of the 2 percent levy on the proceeds of the CDM that makes it truly innovative is that fact that it is collected from private sector actors by an international body, the CDM Executive Board. Its collection is completely independent from national treasuries and other domestic agencies which could make it liable to domestic revenue problems. The money that will be raised for developing country adaptation through the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund depends on the evolution of the CDM, both in quantity and in price terms. According to the UNFCCC (2007b), World Bank (2006b), and UNDP (2007), the total proceeds from selling the 2% of issued CERs up to 2012 would be between $80 to $300 million, $100 to 500 million, and $160 to 950 million, respectively (depending on price and volume scenarios), while GLOBE International puts the figure at $0.4 to $1.5 billion. 45 According to the expectation of the CDM EB, the range would be $1.8 billion up to $3.4 billion (at current prices) 46 .
Issues
In some ways the most 'natural' extension of the existing innovative financing mechanismi.e. the 2% levy on the proceeds of the CDM -is to extend to scope of that levy to the other flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. Joint Implementation (JI) and International Emissions Trading (IET). It does indeed seem somewhat anomalous that the one mechanism that (i) benefits developing countries, and (ii) already has the highest transaction costs should be given the additional competitive disadvantage of a levy on proceeds. Indeed, it can and has been argued that mitigation activities such as the ones carried out under the CDM (or JI, for that matter) should really not have been discouraged by a levy in the first place. But since it exists and is unlikely to be repealed in the absence of a viable alternative, it is important to avoid additional perverse disincentives in attempts to extend it to the other mechanisms, in particular to IET.
IET is the system of trade in Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) established as one of flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. It is based on the International Transaction Log, administered by the UNFCCC Secretariat which records and approves the transactions of AAUs reported by national registries. International trades are those which involve an exchange between national transaction logs.
The debate on extending the 2% adaptation levy to IET under the Kyoto Protocol has so far mainly been focused on where the levy should be applied. Should it be at the 'point of value creation' (i.e. at the point of issuance of AAUs 47 ) -as in the CDM − or should each subsequent individual trade be levied? Should it be an 'issuance' or a 'transaction levy'? Transaction Levies. The main objection, particularly by the EU, to a 'market-transaction levy' which would apply to individual transactions or trades is that it would interfere with the efficiency of the market. It would discourage market participation and possibly encourage informal trading/secondary markets. From adaptation funding point of view, a levy on domestic transactions − which are settled domestically by the national registries -would in all likelihood also face the domestic revenue problem. International trades, however, are settled by the International Transaction Log (ITL) itself, and it should hence be possible to levy a percentage of the AAUs transferred across national registries and kept in a holding account for monetization, as happens in the issuance levy on the CDM.
Issuance Levies. Unlike in the case of CERs, levying AAUs at the point of issuance does not introduce a perverse disincentive, since AAUs are permits to emit -an activity that should be discouraged − and not certificates of mitigation efforts. 48 The problem with an issuance levy is that, in general, issuance of AAUs for the purpose of trading between sub-national entities would be through national institutions as in the case of the EU ETS, leading to the sort of domestic revenue problems discussed above.
The Norwegian Proposal
However, there is one type of issuance that is genuinely international, namely the allocation of the country Assigned Amounts (AAs) themselves. And therefore it would seem that the one option of extending the (2 percent) adaptation levy to IET which would not fall foul of either objections with regards to market interference or to domestic revenue problems is the proposal in Norway's recent submission to the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on LongTerm Cooperative Action under the Convention that at the international level, a small portion of permits could be withheld from national quota allocation, and auctioned by the appropriate international institution. The resulting revenue could then be placed in a fund to be used on adaptation actions or other specified purposes such as technology development.
49
To be a truly international levy, the AAUs could be pooled in a holding account at the ITL −prior to issuance of the (appropriately reduced) Assigned Amounts to the country registries − to be monetised by the Adaptation Fund like the CERs collected through the CDM levy which are kept in a holding account of the CDM registry. Assuming the level of such an international IET issuance levy would mirror the 2 percent of the CDM adaptation levy, the annual revenue at current prices would be in the region of $14 billion. The only outright rejection came from the Ukraine which, focussing on the relative immaturity of JI (a concern shared by the EU 52 ), rejects an extension of the adaptation levy to that mechanism. All remaining (Annex II) submissions welcome an opportunity to discuss the issue, albeit with certain caveats.
New Zealand, Norway, and the EU put forward that the discussion on adaptation finance under the Kyoto Protocol in general − and on the extension of the levies in particular − need to be coordinated with the Bali Road map negotiations, and require more certainty about the adaptation cost scenarios. Opinions differ on other issues. For example, while Japan seems to contemplate a transaction based IET levy, 53 the EU rejects "transfer-based levies" as inefficient and adversely impacting the transparency and liquidity in the carbon market and potentially limiting its expansion.
And while Japan insists that since JI and Emission Trading are Kyoto Mechanisms which do not involve developing countries … a certain justification is required if the share of proceeds to assist adaptation costs in developing countries should be extended to JI and/or Emission
Trading, Saudi Arabia argues on grounds of common but differentiated responsibilities that precisely because the current financing for adaptation through share of proceeds from CDM is mainly coming from projects in developing countries … the financing through share of proceeds from joint implementation and emission trading is essential for the future elaboration of the Kyoto Protocol.
In the larger perspective, it is interesting that while most of the Submissions recognise the need for increasing the scale of funding, as New Zealand put it, the views on the nature of such funding appear to differ. While most of the developing country submissions focus on the Specifically, the Blueprint envisages that a special 'collection authority' be created that would be under the guidance of the UNFCCC COP and collaborate with ICAO 58 and the IMO 59 in collecting a number of levies on a levy on international aviation and maritime transport, namely: a) a 0.01% levy on international airfares and maritime transport freight charges operated by Annex II nationals; b) a 0.001% levy on international airfares and maritime transport freight charges operated by Non Annex I nationals; c) exemptions to (a) and (b) would apply to all flights and maritime freight to and from LDCs and SIDS (irrespective of whether the airlines or freight are owned by Annex II or Non Annex I nationals).
The proposal itself does not include any estimates of the level of revenue that might be expected from this type of levy, but based on the total (air and maritime) UNCTAD 2007 freight cost data for 2005, the expected annual revenue at these proposed levels would be $37m from Annex I, and $2.6m from non-Annex I, 60 indicating that the levy would clearly have to be very significantly increased to be meaningful, say by a factor of 100, in which case it would yield $4bn annually, 40% of which earmarked for the Adaptation Fund (i.e. $1.6bn, the figure used in Summary Table 3 ).
An issue that might backfire though introducing the domestic revenue problem by the backdoor, however, is the attempt in the BSM proposal to introduce the sort of sovereign distinctions reflected in conditions (a), (b), and (c) above. The essential feature of all such levies on international transport is that they can be designed to deliver genuinely international revenues: moneys that cannot readily be tied down to belong to a country, or, to be more precise, to its fiscal revenue system. This indeed was one of the chief motivations behind the IATAL idea, to which we shall turn shortly. All efforts should be taken to retain this international character, in order to avoid domestic revenue problems to ruin the potential of the source for international adaptation funding.
International Air Travel Adaptation Levy (IATAL)
The IATAL idea was launched in 2006 as a means to raise an estimated $4 to $10billion per annum of genuinely additional and innovative international funding for developing country adaptation efforts. 61 As a solidarity levy, it has since been discussed at the Second and Third Plenary Meeting of the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development 62 (Oslo, 6-7 February 2007, and Seoul, 3-4 September 2007). While there was strong support from the Norwegian Presidency at the first meeting, the proposal was seen by many country as a threat to the purpose of the Leading Group levy, namely to fund development, and, in particular, action 'against poverty and hunger.' The main obstacle was that, despite the continuing support by the Norwegian government, most of the key delegations of the Group -wishing to keep the purpose of the Levy to remain developmental -unfortunately still see 'adaptation to climate change' as a purely environmental problem, and not as a developmental one.
However, as the Leading Group prepares itself to expand the scope of its solidarity levy to the sphere of finance -including a Currency Transaction Development Levy (CTDL) 63 -the idea might sink in that (i) adaptation to the impacts of climate change is a development issue, and (ii) the solidarity of levies on polluting activities − such as air travel − should in a first instance be with those who are being polluted, i.e. those most vulnerable to climate change.
Apart from being genuinely innovative, in the sense of being new and additional to ODA, as well as international, predictable, and grant-based, IATAL has the one further interesting equity feature, namely that it levies funds from polluting individuals who are better off to help the less well-off victims of their pollution purely on grounds of individual capability. It is a truly international solidarity levy.
A recent report by the GLOBE International Adaptation Working Group, recognising the argument that a levy on aviation will have a double positive effect. Firstly, for demandelastic short-haul flights, demand for aviation will be reduced, resulting in fewer flights and fewer greenhouse gas emissions. Secondly, for demand-inelastic air travel (long-haul business flights), significant funds will be raised -recommends that the IATAL proposal be given serious consideration by legislators from the G8 and +5 as a meaningful way for the aviation (and potentially maritime) sector to contribute to combating climate change. 64 
International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS)
The IMERS idea was launched in early2006 as a scheme based on the idea of establishing a 'maritime greenhouse gas fund' directly under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) with revenue from an upstream fuel levy, and a key aim of spending an estimated $2 billion of the annual revenue for adaptation in developing countries. 65 The idea was taken up in discussions at the IMO and UNFCCC fora.
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th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the IMO in Denmark, for example, proposed a global bunker levy as a way forward to achieve Green House Gas Emission reductions throughout the maritime industry. 66 However, while funding for adaptation is still one of the objectives, the revenue, according to the Danish proposal, should primarily be applied for the … purchase of CO 2 credits. The Danish proposal also envisages a national collection of the levy, to be channelled to an independent international maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emission fund, managed by parties/organizations yet to be determined.
Under the original IMERS proposal, however, the levy is meant to be collected through a supra-national approach modelled on the existing International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds which are envisaged to provide some of their collection instruments. The levy is driven by the sectoral long-term emission reduction goal and carbon price. In 2012 it is estimated to be $30 per ton of maritime fuel (equivalent to 5% of current fuel price of $600/ton) generating in the region of $ 4 billion for adaptation in developing countries, 30% of which is reserved for LDCs. The contribution to adaptation to climate change in developing countries is estimated to reach $15 billion in 2020 assuming (for CO 2 price of $60/tCO 2 ). 67 
Evaluation of Proposed Revenue Instruments
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the key to the acceptability of international adaptation funding is whether it is
• new and additional: in particular, over and above ODA;
• predictable: in particular, not subject to the 'domestic revenue problem'; • appropriate: in particular, neither (voluntary) grants, nor (reimbursable) loans;
• equitable: in particular, reflecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (UNFCCC, Art. 3.1) • adequate: in the tens of $/€ billions.
In discussing which, if any, of these proposals satisfy these criteria, it is useful to introduce a few distinctions relating to what earlier has been called the 'domestic revenue problem', i.e. the problem of 'exporting' funds that have been raised in a domestic context that allows them to be identified as 'national' money. The archetypal use of such national funds in the present context is Official Development Assistance (ODA), be it 'bilateral', or 'multilateral' (such as GEF Trust Fund replenishments). Money which, by contrast, is raised through an international organisation/body in a manner which does not allow them to be easily, if at all, identified as belonging to a particular country/treasury, is here referred to as 'international.' The only money which, at present, is international in this sense is the revenue to be realised through the monetisation of the two-percent levy on the proceeds of the CDM, collected by the CDM Executive Board on behalf of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund.
New and Additional
International funds are, by definition, additional, and given that none of them touches the source of the only existing international mechanism (i.e. CERs), they all constitute 'new funding.' Bilateral and multilateral schemes, by contrast, are not so straight forward. The 'additionality' of payments drawn from conventional fiscal revenue, in particular, is notoriously difficult to be ascertained, and clearly it is not a new source. That does not mean that national money will always fail to be new and additional: carbon based revenue clearly will be additional (to conventional funding), and it is likely to be 'new,' at least for some time being.
Predictable
The main obstacle to any scheme which is national -in the above-mentioned sense -is that it is seen by the domestic tax-payers/voters to be 'their money,' and for which domestic spending will have priority (the 'domestic revenue problem') Of course, the domestic revenue problem is not necessarily fatal for multilateral finance proposals. For one, it is likely to be less relevant for unconventional funding -such as the national levies proposed on EU ETS auction revenues -than for conventional funding taken from traditional fiscal revenue. Moreover, proposals such as that by Mexico, with its initial $10 billion scale, could well be below the domestic revenue pain threshold. China's proposal of an additional 0.5 percent of GDP, by contrast, would clearly not be below that threshold, whether funded through fiscal commitments (general domestic taxation), or commitments with regard to unconventional (carbon-based) funding. 68 The point is that, even though carbon-based funding may be less susceptible to the domestic revenue problem, at the level suggested by the Chinese proposal, people are likely to remember the 'national' origin of the funds and insist that they stay in the country and be channelled into the general domestic budget.
The effect is that international transfers of national funds -whether conventional or unconventional, bilateral or multilateral -are unlikely to be really predictable. Indeed, chances are that if governments were to take on some form of targets concerning regular/predictable transfers abroad, they would sooner or later be forced to withdraw from the agreement by their electorates. Given this risk, countries will simply not sign up to such commitments in the first place.
The domestic revenue problem, in other words, is the key to why governments resist at all cost to enter into binding regular foreign funding commitments of any type and any scale. The problem with proposals such as those by China and Mexico is therefore not even primarily that they would not be predictable, but that they are simply not viable propositions, that they 'will not fly'.
International funds are therefore the only genuine predictable source of funding for adaptation in developing countries, and it is important not to compromise their international character by distinctions which could be regarded as providing the means for a national identification, such as may be the danger with the differentiation of the levy proposed by Tuvalu.
Appropriate
'Appropriateness,' as used here, refers to the form in which the money in question changes hands. There are a number of different formats that could be used, such as that of a loan, a grant, or a simple straightforward payment. As mentioned earlier, many developing countries see adaptation costs as being imposed on them by the industrialised world, and as such (largely) a responsibility of developed countries. This, of course, means that payments in the form of loans and even grants are not seen to be appropriate. Debts are not settled in that manner.
This thinking may strike one as not sufficiently pragmatic, or even as 'outdated' as UK Ministers recently put it in an editorial letter. 69 After all, are not highly concessional loans, with practically no interest as well as almost infinite repayment schedules for all practical intents and purposes the same as grants? Well, if that were indeed the case, then why are these loans not simply given as grants? Clearly there is a significant difference given the reluctance of having the UK contributions to the World Bank Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience transformed from loans into grants, given the considerable pressure from the NGO sector. As it happens, none of the other financing proposals discussed above involve loans, or (ODA) grants.
Equitable
Raising revenues will impose burdens, which -to be acceptable -need to be shared equitably. In the context of climate change, the key burden sharing principle is that of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' enshrined in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC.
National Funding
As concerns the sharing of national burdens, a recent study 70 has estimated the current share of historic responsibilities for climate change of developed countries to be twice that of developing countries, while the capability of developed countries -as reflected in per capita GDP -is five times that of the developing world. If, following Aristotle, one assumes that burdens are equitable ('just') if they are proportional, in this case to (historic) responsibility and capability, then the industrialised world must shoulder the lion's share of any climate change burden, namely anywhere between 65% and 85%, 71 depending on how much weight is given to responsibility and capability, respectively.
Ultimately, the one burden sharing problem that does count in the present context is that of sharing the costs of adaptation, the fairness of which is obviously difficult to assess in the absence of more precise ideas on how much the adaptation that is and will be needed will actually cost. In the absence of these figures, the burden that is likely to be scrutinised is that of raising the revenue in question. All of the national schemes discussed above − apart from those from within the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) members (i.e. the Swiss and the Mexican proposal) − envisage funding to come only from developed countries, which means they are clearly not unfair to developing countries, as far as the revenue burden is concerned. However, they can, and in most cases would nonetheless lead to an unfair distribution of the incurred adaptation costs, simply because they are very likely to be inadequate to cover the costs for developing country adaptation over and above what these countries can in fairness be expected to cover themselves.
The two proposals that do envisage contributions by developing countries are interesting in different respects. Switzerland envisages a uniform carbon tax of $2/tCO 2 for all countries, with a per capita tax allowance of 1.5tCO 2 , which does imply a de facto differentiated tax rate (Figure 4) . All the same, the developing world would still be envisaged to contribute 52% of the revenue to this tax, which would be difficult to defend as being fair in the context of the above mentioned responsibility/capability shares. It has been argued 72 that this is not the correct way in judging the fairness of the proposal; that one really should consider only the proportion of the tax revenue which would be destined for international transfers -through the proposed Multilateral Adaptation Fund -in which case the developing country share would drop to 23% (Figure 3 ). Yet, while it has to be emphasised that the ultimate fairness of such adaptation finance proposals can only be judged in the context of whether they deliver a fair distribution of adaptation costs, it would be unwise for developing countries to disregard domestic funding in this way, for otherwise they might well be expected to pay considerably more than their fair share. 73 If, however, their share in tax contribution is the same (or less) than the share they can in fairness be expected to pay, then this is unlikely to arise, which is why the Swiss proposal would have to be modified, say by increasing the personal tax allowance.
Turning to the Mexican proposal, the issues are slightly different, as no developing country is actually meant to be committed to contribute. The problem is really with the incentive structure which is meant to get certain developing countries 'with emerging economies' 74 to take on such commitments 'voluntarily', as it were, namely that they would be excluded from the benefits if they don't. According to the proposal, this novel approach would make it possible to increase participation and empowerment of non-Annex I countries within the climate regime, without compromising the fundamental principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities while taking each country's capacity into account. 75 However, given that the sharing of climate related burdens -mitigation or adaptation -is indeed determined by responsibilities and capabilities, one's entitlement to receiving funds for these activities should not be dependent on whether one is willing or not to pay into some fund. Indeed, the proposal by Mexico, in this respect, is quite similar to what has become known as the 'Russian Proposal' under which developing countries were meant to have been incentivised to take on 'voluntary commitments' by giving them special access to technology transfer and adaptation funding. And it stands to reason that it will therefore be equally illfated. Moreover, it is doubtful whether empowerment of developing countries within the climate regime should be tied to their being willing to pay something, whether it is for a fund or anything else.
International Funding
International funding can have similar characteristics as the national variety. For example, the reason why the Norwegian proposal (section 6.3) is unlikely to give rise to accusations of unfairness from the developing world is that it is based on contributions only from Parties that will take on binding emission caps in the next commitment period, which is unlikely to be anyone from the developing world, particularly as represented by the G77+China..
However, international funding can also introduce a significantly different perspective concerning equity, or, to be more precise, concerning the type of responsibility/capability involved. The sharing of the burden of national funding is generally judged in terms of country responsibilities and capacities. In international funding, this can -and some (including the author) might argue should -change. The level of responsibility/capability addressed in judging the fairness of international funding should correspond to the agents who are being asked to pay. In the case of the proposed IATAL, the individuals who would be asked to pay would be individual passengers, and the fairness of the levy should hence be determined with regards to personal responsibilities for climate change and individual capability to pay. In other words, the levy should primarily be paid by people who have a large carbon footprint and who can afford to pay. Both conditions seem to apply to air passengers quite generally: subsistence farmers from rural India are generally not found on airplanes, and people who do fly will generally have a significant carbon footprint. 76 In other words, the fairness of funding scheme such as the ones we are considering here, when judged in terms of sharing the revenue burden, depends on the responsibilities/capabilities of who pays -countries, firms, individuals -and it is important to be mindful of these distinctions, if one wishes to avoid losing income because of equity grievances by those who are asked to pay.
Adequate
'Adequacy', in the present context is meant to refer to being sufficient to cover the relevant costs. If we define adequacy, for these purposes, as $10 billion or more, then we have four proposals, as listed in Table 3 , which are adequate, namely the Chinese +0.5% GDP proposal, the Swiss Carbon Tax, the IATAL, IMERS and the Norwegian proposal to for an international auction of assigned amount units. However, the Chinese and the Swiss proposal are unlikely to be viable, primarily because of their reliance on national funding. This leaves the Norwegian proposal and IATAL/IMERS (or something like it, based on international travel/transport).
Conclusions and Recommendation
To be acceptable, adaptation funding for developing countries must be (i) new and additional, (ii) predictable, (iii) appropriate, (iv) equitable, and (v) adequate.
National funding schemes − that is schemes based on revenue generated and collected nationally -are unlikely to be acceptable in this sense, primarily because of a lack of predictability due to the domestic revenue problem (see Section A.2).
All of the international schemes discussed in this Section satisfy all of the mentioned acceptability desiderata except adequacy. Indeed, relative to the funding demand levels mentioned in Section A.1, none of the discussed international funding proposals would yield adequate adaptation funding on its own (see Table 3 ). The most promising candidates with regard to generating significant levels of (international) revenue are the Norwegian proposal of an international auction of assigned amount units, and some form of solidarity levy on bunker fuel activities, such as IATAL/IMERS, possibly under the Tuvalu Burden Sharing Mechanism (Section B.7).
Apart from having the potential to deliver adequate, new and additional, appropriate, and predictable funding for adaptation in developing countries, a combination of the Norwegian proposal and (something akin to) IATAL would have the additional benefit of addressing a fundamental equity problem, in that it would reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capability not only at the national, but also at the personal level.
Having said this, it is important to keep in mind that 'equity' is not only a distributional ('burden sharing') concern. It is equally a matter of fairness in procedures, which will be addressed in Section D on the proper management of adaptation funding.
C. How to spend the money raised: The need for strategic spending One thing that is abundantly clear about the distribution of adaptation funding which is 'adequate,' − i.e. which covers the estimated funding needs of developing countries -through international agencies: it has to change! At present, the international mode of spending adaptation funding − be it through the GEF or the Adaptation Fund (AF) -is predominantly meant to be through "concrete adaptation projects" 77 , to use the formulation in the remit of the AF. But given that the funds to be channelled through are meant to be in the tens of billions of dollars, clearly this sort of micro-management would be beyond the capability of small bodies such as the Adaptation Fund Boards. 78 The proposal for a Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) by the World Bank, for example, acknowledges that there is an urgent need to go beyond assessments of vulnerability and small scale projects and to gain more experience in integrating climate resilience routinely into development plans and activities. … The proposed PPCR has been designed to explore adaptation actions at a scale not yet feasible under any of the existing funds. 79 Yet, in the longer term, even this sort of domestic mainstreaming activities may prove to be too hands-on a format for disbursing international adaptation funding. After all, there are many different types of international activities − including technology transfer, disaster preparedness assistance, risk insurance -which clearly cover aspects of adaptation assistance, which are not covered (at least not at the scale required) by the present project-based disbursement vehicles, or by domestic mainstreaming.
At the same time, it is equally clear that it would not be desirable to create new institutions or programmes for the purpose of addressing these issues (at scale), if there are existing international instruments which could perfectly well carry out the required activities, even if they are not dedicated solely to climate change adaptation. To have a dedicated new international agency dealing with reducing climate change induced natural disasters alone would clearly not make sense given that there already is a UN agency that deals with disaster reduction − the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) in Geneva. 80 The same is the case for many other adaptation activities. For example, climate change impact risks could be addressed through insurance-related instruments -these might be strictly climate related, or more general, such as the proposed European Commission/World Bank Global Index Insurance Framework. 81 Economic shocks due to whether related disasters could be dealt with through the Exogenous Shock Facility of the IMF, 82 and the funding of relief efforts connected with climate/weather related disasters is probably best dealt with through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 83 administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
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In short, while there is a strong case to centralise the collection of (innovative) international adaptation funding through a single international agency -say the Adaptation Fund -it makes no sense to have this agency micro-manage the disbursement of these funds, be it through specially created sub-agencies, or, worse still, on its own. The remit of such an "international adaptation revenue agency" must be that of an international adaptation treasury, namely to make sure that there are sufficient funds available, and to disburse the collected funds as core funding to other agencies to undertake adaptation activities in their field of expertise.
D. How to manage innovative international financing
• The fact that adaptation to climate change is becoming more and more urgent, and that a project by project approach will not be sufficient to tackle the problem, is becoming widely recognised. After all, it was the realisation that climate change needs to be incorporated at all levels of decision making which led the IBRD (World Bank) and a number of donor countries to propose the idea of what has is now called the 'Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience' to be housed under a 'Strategic Climate Fund.' Although the design of these instruments is still ongoing -they are meant to be formally launched at the forthcoming G8 meeting in Japan -the debate that has already led to significant changes in the design of these instruments is instructive, if only as illustration of what should be avoided in attempts to set up financial instruments for the purpose of funding climate change activities, in general, and adaptation, in particular.
Climate change funding for developing countries is fundamentally different from other types of development related funding. In light of the significant differences in historic responsibility for climate change, 85 most developing countries see costs for mitigation, adaptation and impact response not as their costs, but as debts by the industrialised for having largely created the problem in the first place. Consequently, they have begun to reject the donor dominated governance structures of traditional multilateral funding -in the climate change context paradigmatically represented by the governance of the GEF -and have instead opted for an architecture which they see as more appropriate for the purpose of this sort of 'debt collection.' The credit agency philosophy of "those-who-pay-have-the-say" simply does not apply to debt collection, where the recipients are the ones who see themselves as legitimately calling the shots.
This trend manifested itself initially in the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, which led to a governance structure not only with a majority of developing country representatives but also with decision-making based on a one-member-one-vote rule. Although the detailed modalities of how the AF will be managed have at the time of writing not yet been finalised, there are signs that the Board of the AF will conduct its meetings with the same openness and transparency as that of the other UNFCCC bodies, such as the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, which is open to all UNFCCC accredited observers and has its meetings webcast. The AF, as it emerged, has managed to harness widespread ownership among developing countries, who see it as genuinely their fund. This is why the original World Bank proposal for an 'Adaptation Pilot Fund,' when made public, generated a considerable amount of controversy − not only because it was seen as a competitor to the AF, but also because the proposed donor-only governance. 86 This has led to a number of significant changes in the design of this instrument − now called the 'Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience'− not least of which the introduction of a 2012 sunset clause to avoid competing with the Adaptation Fund, and North-South parity on the Programme's governing body, the PPCR Sub Committee. While there is still room for improvement in the governance of the super-ordinate SCF Trust Fund Committee, 87 the fact that -in stark contrast to the initial consultative documents -the latest draft designs for these instruments are not only publically available on the internet, but can be commented on online, constitutes a major breakthrough for the openness and transparency of the process which can only be welcomed and must be encouraged! In sum, to be not only politically acceptable but effective, the governance of international financial instruments for climate change must genuinely be democratic, indeed give the recipients the dominant voice in the decision-making. And the procedures must not only be transparent but public. The former is essential for the political acceptability, while the latter is a sine qua non, particularly if the funding is used for activities such as 'mainstreaming' of adaptation into development policies, since that will ultimately require the buy-in not just of governments, but of stakeholders at all levels of domestic decision making. It was the first time in recent years that so many developing countries and their groupings had put forward such concrete and systemic proposals on the Convention's financial mechanism, said a long-time participant of the UNFCCC process.
Several of the countries referred to the large amounts of funds which are being planned for organisations outside the UNFCCC, particularly the World Bank, and said that these funds should instead by placed under the Convention, which is the body in charge of cleat change negotiations and the implementation of the outcomes.
China notably stated that funds provided to organizations outside the Convention would not be counted as being in fulfilment of the developed countries' commitments under the UNFCCC to provide financial resources to developing countries to help them take action on climate issues. India concurred with this view.
The Philippines said climate-related funds should be placed in the Convention and not other institutions, and if we are not serious (in making outside funds comply with the Convention's principles and priorities) it did not see what future there would be for the Bali Action Plan.
The proposals of developing countries were made on 5 June at a workshop on investment and financial flows, which is an official part of the meeting of the ad hoc working group on longterm cooperative action (AWG-LCA) under the Convention. The group is tasked with implementing the Bali Action Plan and coming up with a decision by the end of 2009.
Besides the members of the G77 and China, other countries providing proposals included Mexico, South Korea and Switzerland, while Japan, the EU and US also spoke.
G77 and China
The first workshop presentation was by Bernarditas Müller of the Philippines, on behalf of the G77 and China. She said the G77 and China had identified basic principles under which they would like to work in the context of enhancing financial resources (a major element of the Bali Action Plan).
Müller (who is coordinator of the G77 and China in the AWG-LCA) said that at the first AWG-LCA meeting in Bangkok, members of the group had spoken about establishing various funds, such as an adaptation fund, a technology fund and a risk insurance fund. The G77 and China believed that this enhanced action should be guided by the following principles:
• Operate under the authority and guidance of and by fully accountable to the Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC.
• Have an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance.
• Enable direct access to funding by the recipients.
• Ensure recipient countries' involvement during the definition, identification and implication of the actions.
• Müller said Group is developing a proposal based on the above principles, which take into account various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 4.3, 4.4., 4.7, 4.9 and in accordance with article 11.
Least Developed Country (LDC) Group
Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs, said the investments of today determine the extent of climate change tomorrow. It put forward "principles and an architecture of a future funding mechanism." These included: (1) Adequacy of funds, to meet the needs of adaptation, mitigation, and technology transfer; (2) The equity principle; (3) Likely sources of funding should be from developed countries in implementing their commitment under Article 4.3, and other possible sources include a levy on airline travel, an international fuel levy, an extension of the Adaptation Fund's levy to other mechanisms, venture capital and the carbon market.
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
Barbados, on behalf of the small island developing states (SIDS), represented by Selwin Hart, said the funds for adaptation were inadequate. Any resources must be additional to traditional ODA. Referring to financing that is market-based, it said that markets don't work well in small economies. Financing for mitigation is more readily available and easier to access than for adaptation (for example the private sector is not interested to build a seawall or restore coral reefs).
Barbados put forward a shared vision on adaptation financing in the UNFCCC: (1) New and additional funds above the current commitments on ODA and 0.7% target; (2) Predictability: and stability in funding, which should be sourced from assessed contributions from developed countries and levies of carbon markets; (3) The funds should be in the form of grants rather than loans (as SIDS have to adapt to climate problems caused by emissions and lifestyles of other countries). This should also be consistent with the polluter pays principle; (4) Priority access should be given to the most vulnerable countries; (5) The governance should be under the UNFCCC.
The SIDS also advanced these specific proposals: (1) Establish a Convention adaptation fund. The aim is to implement Convention articles including 4.3 and 4.4, in line with the polluter pays principle. Access to recipients should be direct. Governance should be under the authority of the COP; (2) Establish an insurance mechanism; (3) Set up a Technology Fund; (4) We also support a Mitigation Fund.
The SIDS also stated that there are many bilateral and other instruments, but they are not under UNFCCC. These should be channelled through Convention process.
China
China made a formal presentation, putting forward a proposal on the elements and structure of multilateral funds operating under the Convention. China added that scaling up of funding is needed. If it remains at the same level, it will not meet the future requirements for adaptation and mitigation.
China then proposed the establishment of a set of new funds under the UNFCCC. The new financing would have the following elements: (1) The source of funding is the implementation of developed countries' commitments under UNFCCC; (2) The scale of funding should be a certain percentage of the GDP of developed countries, for example 0.5% of GDP, in addition to existing ODA; (3) The funds would be used to enhance mitigation, adaptation, R&D in technology, and technology transfer; (4) Any funding pledged outside the UNFCCC shall not be regarded as being in fulfilment of commitments by developed countries under article 4.3 of the Convention.
China also proposed the following coordinated funding arrangements: (1) In the design, there would be the establishment of a number of specialized funds, including an Adaptation Fund and a Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund; (2) On Governance, (a) The Fund would be established under the authority and guidance of and fully accountable to the COP, (b) There would be equitable and balanced representation of all parties in the governance, (c) There would be easy access and low management costs.
Japan asked China to explain its statement that any funds outside the UNFCCC cannot be counted as part of developed countries' implementation of their Article 4.3 commitment. Would this mean China wants to make UNFCCC an aid agency?
China responded that the UNFCCC is not an aid agency, but it is the most appropriate forum to discuss climate change. The developed countries have an obligation to developing countries in the Convention. If Japan wants to pledge its money outside the Convention, that should not be counted as fulfilling part of its commitment under the UNFCCC." India India, represented by Mr.Surya Sethi, presented a comprehensive analysis of the status of climate financing, which he showed fell far short of financing needs, such as the Stern estimate of 1% of world GDP which in 2007 translates to $540 billion.
He said the World Bank group is not in a position to handle the funds required. Any funding structure of the international financial institutions will remain outside of the UNFCCC. The funding mandate of the IFIs is economic development and the capacity of these should not divert to climate change. The IBRD disbursement in 2007 is minus $6.2 billion, which means they receive more than they disburse. No wonder the World Bank wants to expand to climate change, he said.
India said that alternative means for predictable resource flows is needed. We need a new global fund, capitalised by developed countries at a level of 0.3% to 1% of GDP, said India.
India proposed the establishment of a new financial architecture in the UNFCCC. It should have the following elements:
• It must operate under the guidance and must be accountable to the COP.
• There would be balanced representation in the governance.
• Direct access by parties to the funds.
• It should be demand driven, with recipients involved in definition of needs.
• It should be funded by developed countries and may accept other resources from the market and other sources.
• It should be organized in functional windows for technology, venture capital for emerging technologies, and a fund for research and development.
• Other funds should be integrated under the Convention.
• A Board would govern, and there should be a professional secretariat, aided by technical committees. This design was achieved under the Montreal Protocol, and under the Kyoto Protocol's adaptation fund.
• The unifying force of the various funds to be set up is a common governing architecture which is under the control of COP. Each window will grow under this architecture.
Discussion
Argentina proposed the establishment of a multilateral fund, as a framework and an umbrella system. It can cover various areas including adaptation and technology. It will develop financial resources of existing funds that exist and that may come up in future. It can include elements mentioned by China and other countries.
Malaysia welcomed the idea of establishing a new funding mechanism. It should be under COP. It should also enable direct access by recipients. This mechanism will be assisted by expert or technical panels. Funding will be by Annex I parties to fulfil their commitment in accordance with Article 4.3, and additional sources can be determined. The fund should complement the existing funds. Competing mechanisms outside the UNFCCC poses a serious challenge to the Convention and this is cause for concern.
Philippines said the finance commitment was not being implemented, there has been inadequate funding and the agreed full incremental cost has not been given to developing countries. The Convention's parties had also decided that consistency must be ensured between the principles and priorities of the COP with bilateral and other funds on climate operating outside the Convention and that they must not impose new conditionalities.
Referring to recent initiatives outside the Convention to set up new climate funds, she remarked that if we are not serious about this issue, she did not see what future there would be for the Bali Action Plan. There are funds out there. They should not be put in bodies that impose conditionality on developing countries. They should be put in the hands of the parties of the Convention.
South Africa, on behalf of the Africa Group, emphasized the group's support for the G77 and China's principles presented by Philippines. The scale of funding for adaptation must be scaled up 2 or 3 times. There is need for assessing costs, planning, NAPAs, implementation for adaptation, mitigation technologies, wider deployment of existing technologies and R and D for new technologies.
Brazil said there was a need for funds to be in compliance with UNFCCC. It stressed the need for a fund with a governance structure that is fair and transparent and reinforces the COP's capacity to guide climate change.
Saudi Arabia said there was a need to bring all the ideas of the funds together. There is need for a solid structure in UNFCCC where all the initiatives can be put together in a structure, as laid out by the G77/China principles. The goal is to bring under one umbrella a solid new architecture. It would operate under the authority and guidance of the Convention and be fully accountable to the COP.
Mexico pointed to the unpredictability of current funding and the need to overcome the atomization of current financing in many funds. The current financial system is totally insufficient to sustain the scale of actions needed.
It proposed a World Climate Change Fund covering mitigation, adaptation, and technology. All countries would contribute to it, with contributions to be agreed multilaterally and could be determined by criteria like Greenhouse gas emissions, population and GDP size, as well as the polluter pay principle, equity and efficiency and each country's capacity. The Fund should mobilize no less than $10 billion a year, with $200 billion by 2030.
Mitigation activities to be supported should yield measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation results. Activities to be funded include forest, agricultural soils, biofuels, energy, green buildings, lower-emission vehicles.
Korea, represented by Raekwon Chung, advanced a proposal on carbon credit for NAMA (nationally appropriate mitigation actions) by developing countries, supported by finance that is measurable, reportable and verifiable. In this scheme, mitigation can be initiated by developing countries even without finance and technology, similar to a unilateral CDM.
He suggested that Annex I countries undertake a deeper emission reduction target to facilitate more funds. Instead of developed countries offering to contribute to funds, they could instead buy credits for NAMA.
Switzerland presented a proposal on a "funding scheme for Bali Action Plan". It proposed a global carbon dioxide levy of $2 per ton of carbon dioxide, in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities. There would be three pillars in the scheme. Overall revenues would be $48.5 billion, with $18.4 billion to a multilateral adaptation fund or MAF (with a $9.2 billion prevention pillar and a $9.2 billion insurance pillar), and $30.1 billion going to national climate change funds.
High income countries will transfer 60% of their levy to the MAF, medium income countries 35% and low income countries 15%. Countries with below 1.5 ton of carbon dioxide emission are exempted from payment; Switzerland said these would mainly be LDCs.
Brazil commented that the Swiss proposal had taken current emission rather than historical responsibility on board when choosing who to tax. Switzerland replied historical responsibility was counted if the future emissions is counted but not so in relation to past emissions.
Germany, for the European Union, said the challenge is to stabilize greenhouse gases at 450 ppm, restrict temperature rise to 2 degrees and to reduce emissions. Finance is required for a transition to a low carbon economy. Most funds for mitigation will be from the private sector and this won't change in future, but pubic funds are still needed to catalyze and leverage private investments.
In mobilizing financial flows, the main tool is the price of carbon as the carbon market is delivering a significant part of the flows. On innovative financing, the EU can discuss auctioning of carbon allowances and a levy on bunker fuel.
Norway proposed a scheme for "financing adaptation by auctioning" in which a small percentage of asset value can be auctioned or sold to finance adaptation. The task can be given to an international bank.
The United States, commenting on other countries' remarks on the World Bank climate funds, said that the clean technology fund under this is not meant for unmet contributions under the Convention. It will be supportive of the objectives of the Convention. It is hosted at the World Bank as it will provide rapid disbursement of funds and leverage other funds.
As the private sector gives most investments, the issue is how governments can encourage private sector flows to clean technologies. Countries with an enabling environment, open markets and respect for IPRs will attract more clean technologies.
Surya Sethi of India, responding to Japan and US relating to the World Bank climate funds, said that the funds to developing countries for climate must come in the form of resource transfer or grant. "If I borrow money I have to return it and it is not funding my full additional cost," said India. "Any mechanism must ensure the full incremental cost must be met and it won't be met by loans even if these are concessional."
The Chair of the AWG-LCA, Luiz Machado of Brazil, said the discussion had been rich, there were some areas of convergence and some new and innovative ideas. This was a very valuable brainstorming, which could be used for discussing future work. A contact group of the AWG LCA will further take up the finance issue.
